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Research suggests that interventions involving extensive training or countercondi-
tioning can reduce implicit prejudice and stereotyping, and even susceptibility to 
stereotype threat. This research is widely cited as providing an “existence proof” 
that certain entrenched social attitudes are capable of change, but is summarily 
dismissed— by philosophers, psychologists, and activists alike— as lacking direct, 
practical import for the broader struggle against prejudice, discrimination, and in-
equality. Criticisms of these debiasing procedures fall into three categories: concerns 
about empirical efficacy, about practical feasibility, and about the failure to appreci-
ate the underlying structural- institutional nature of discrimination. I reply to these 
criticisms of debiasing, and argue that a comprehensive strategy for combating prej-
udice and discrimination should include a central role for training our biases away.
1. Introduction
More than a decade of research suggests that implicit biases can be transformed 
(or at least considerably weakened) by interventions that involve extensive train-
ing or counterconditioning. In particular, Kerry Kawakami and colleagues have 
demonstrated the benefits of:
counterstereotype training, which involves repeatedly affirming counterste-
reotypes, for example, by responding “yes” to an image of a black person 
paired with the word “friendly,” or by repeatedly pairing images of wom-
en with words like “powerful” and “courageous;” and
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approach training, which involves practicing approach- oriented behaviors to-
ward stigmatized words and images, for example, by moving toward or 
nodding one’s head in response to images of black faces or Arab- Muslim 
names.
In addition to reducing bias on a variety of indirect measures, including the Im-
plicit Association Test (IAT), these training procedures:
• reorient unreflective social behaviors, for example, by leading white and 
Asian participants to instinctively sit closer to a black interlocutor;
• make stereotypes less likely to come to mind and color judgment, for ex-
ample, by reducing the likelihood that participants recommend hiring a 
man over an equally qualified woman; and
• reduce susceptibility to stereotype threat, for example, by improving 
women’s performance on math tests even though they have just been re-
minded of pervasive stereotypes about gender and mathematical aptitude, 
and would otherwise feel anxiety and underperform.
While this research is often cited as providing a sort of “existence proof” that 
certain entrenched social attitudes are capable of change, it is summarily dis-
missed by social scientists, philosophers, and activists as lacking direct, practi-
cal import for the broader struggle against prejudice and discrimination. For 
example, David Schneider’s 568- page opus on social cognition, The Psychology 
of Stereotyping, devotes only a single paragraph to this research on “retraining,” 
concluding that, “Obviously, in everyday life people are not likely to get such 
deliberate training” (2004, 423).
I find the widespread dismissal of these training procedures puzzling. Im-
plicit biases influence whom we trust and whom we ignore, whom we promote 
and for whom we vote. They affect interactions between teachers and students, 
doctors and patients, police and civilians, and lawyers and jurors. The stakes 
are high, then, not just for individuals in prominent gatekeeper positions, but 
for us all.1 Given the myriad ways in which our biases can harm others and our-
selves across many spheres of life, I believe that each of us has an obligation to 
take steps to reduce our biases— if we can. I take this obligation to be relatively 
uncontroversial, at least among those who agree that widespread prejudice and 
discrimination are major social ills. even those who deny that we are direct-
ly morally responsible for controlling our implicit biases, such as levy (2017), 
1. See, e.g., Blair, Dasgupta, and Glaser (2015) for a review of “meaningful life outcomes” af-
fected by implicit attitudes. For more on the ethical and political implications of implicit bias, see 
the contributions to Brownstein and Saul (2016). Thanks to an Ergo referee for urging me to clarify 
the high stakes even for individuals outside gatekeeping positions.
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grant that we may at least be obligated to take steps to reduce our biases so long 
as doing so is reasonably within our power. These procedures promise to put 
bias reduction within our power. So why are they so readily written off?
There are a handful of frequently cited reasons, which are taken either to 
override the defeasible obligation to reduce our biases, or to suggest that pro-
cedures like Kawakami’s will not help us meet that obligation. These reasons 
fall roughly into three categories: concerns about empirical efficacy, about prac-
tical feasibility, and about the failure to appreciate the underlying structural- 
institutional nature of discrimination.
(empirical inefficacy) While skeptics grant that these interventions may be 
somewhat effective in artificial lab- based settings, they press two further empiri-
cal concerns.2 First, many suspect that individuals will quickly “relearn” their 
biases after the debiasing procedure. I call this the relearning worry (Section 
4). Second, many suspect that the effects of debiasing will hold only in highly 
specific contexts, e.g., being visible inside the lab but not outside it. I call this the 
context- specificity worry (Section 5).
(practical unfeasibility) Many allege (typically in passing) that, even if 
these debiasing procedures prove to be effective, they would still be too labori-
ous and time- consuming to be practically feasible (Section 6).3
(individualism) Others argue that the entire project of seeking out effective 
debiasing procedures is overly individualistic, a counterproductive distraction 
from what is at root an institutional problem that demands institutional solu-
tions.4 The idea is that we are wasting our time unless we are talking about di-
rectly changing the underlying material conditions or radically restructuring 
power relations (Section 7).
Here I reply to these criticisms of debiasing, although I give a more thorough 
response to the concerns about individualism elsewhere (Madva 2016b). I begin 
by surveying the relevant research (Section 2), because a clear appreciation of 
some key details of these studies will help to demonstrate that leading concerns 
about debiasing are less pressing than commonly portrayed, and may in some 
respects be altogether unfounded. After reviewing the research, I briefly discuss, 
and express puzzlement over, how theorists tend to construe the practical im-
plications of these findings (Section 3). I then address each of the major concerns 
about debiasing (Sections 4– 7).
Ultimately, I believe, a comprehensive strategy for combating prejudice and 
2. See, e.g., Anderson (2012), Bargh (1999), Devine, Forscher, Austin, and Cox (2012), Gaw-
ronski and Cesario (2013), Huebner (2016), Mendoza, Gollwitzer, and Amodio (2010), Stewart and 
Payne (2008), Olson and Fazio (2006), and Wennekers (2013).
3. See the sources in the previous footnote.
4. See, e.g., Alcoff (2010), Anderson (2010, 2012), Banks and Ford (2008), Dixon, levine, Reich-
er, and Durrheim (2012), Haslanger (2015), and Huebner (2016).
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discrimination should include a central role for training our biases away. I will, 
however, sometimes retreat in what follows to the more modest claims that we 
should collectively take these training procedures far more seriously than we 
currently do, that we should be testing them in field studies, etc. Given that vir-
tually no one— not even the researchers who have developed these procedures— 
is considering such field studies, lending some plausibility to these more modest 
claims would still constitute a major step forward for my position.
2. Research Survey
In this essay, I refer to an intervention as debiasing if one of its aims is to re-
duce or eliminate individuals’ undesirable social prejudices or stereotypes.5 Two 
clarificatory points about this usage of “debiasing” are in order. First, debiasing 
sometimes refers more broadly to any intervention that aims to reduce the im-
pact of bias on outcomes (Beaulac and Kenyon 2014), including, e.g., anonymous 
review. Most likely, reviewing materials anonymously does little to reduce one’s 
biases; rather, it leaves those biases in place but hopefully reduces their influence 
on judgment. While I am generally a proponent of anonymous review, it does 
not count as debiasing in the sense intended here. Second, debiasing often refers 
to efforts to combat general cognitive heuristics and biases (Morewedge et al. 
2015), such as the confirmation bias, whereas my focus is combating undesirable 
attitudes specifically related to social group membership. What distinguishes 
undesirable social attitudes from desirable or innocuous ones? I am persuaded by 
Antony (2002) and Beeghly (2015) that these are empirical and context- sensitive 
questions (see also Section 5; Madva 2016a). An uncontroversial example of an 
undesirable stereotype would be a student who is very interested in math but has 
internalized stereotypes that members of her group are not good at math, such 
that these internalized stereotypes lead her to underperform on math tests. Some 
(very valuable) interventions aim to circumvent these internalized stereotypes 
by designing test- taking environments that make the stereotypes less likely to 
come to mind, or by teaching individuals cognitive techniques that mitigate the 
stereotypes’ undesirable effects. My focus is on interventions that aim to change 
these stereotypes on a more profound psychological level, such that the need to 
circumvent or control them is reduced or eliminated altogether. If biases are like 
a disease, then I am interested here in potential cures and vaccines, rather than 
in ways to manage the problematic symptoms.
Among the many debiasing interventions that have been studied, I focus on 
5. Thanks to an Ergo referee for pressing for more conceptual clarity about debiasing.
 Biased against Debiasing • 149
Ergo • vol. 4, no. 6 • 2017
a specific class of procedures that aim, through active and targeted practice, to 
directly retrain the unreflective habits of thinking, feeling, and acting that under-
lie implicit biases. I’ll argue that procedures of this type have been systematically 
overlooked and even misrepresented by scientists, activists, policymakers, and 
philosophers. I take these procedures to be less vulnerable to prominent con-
cerns about debiasing than are other interventions (see especially Section 5), and 
I believe they may have a distinctive role to play in complementing existing efforts 
to combat prejudice, discrimination, and inequality (see especially Sections 3, 4, 
and 7; Madva 2016b).
In Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, and Russin’s (2000) seminal paper, 
participants repeatedly “negated” stereotypical associations and “affirmed” 
counterstereotypical associations. They saw images of racially typical black and 
white male faces paired with potentially stereotypical traits. In response to ste-
reotypical pairings (a black face with the word “athletic”), they pressed a “NO” 
button. For counterstereotypical pairings (a white face with “athletic”), they 
pressed “YeS.” Participants worked through a total of 384 pairings, or “trials,” 
which took under 45 minutes. Unlike other participants who repeatedly affirmed 
stereotypes or underwent no training, this group went from being biased to un-
biased on a measure of implicit stereotyping, even if tested after 2, 4, 6, and 24 
hours.6 These participants were even less biased the next day, presumably be-
cause they were not fatigued from the training.
Further studies outside of Kawakami’s lab have partially replicated but qual-
ified these findings.7 Two warrant specific mention because they will be relevant 
for addressing concerns about debiasing. First, Gawronski, Deutsch, Mbirkou, 
Seibt, and Strack (2008) observed that the original studies confounded counter-
stereotype affirmation with stereotype negation. They thus split participants 
into two groups, all of whom saw the same overall set of face- word pairings, but 
instructed some to simply affirm the counterstereotypes and others to negate the 
stereotypes. They found that affirming counterstereotypes reduced bias, but ne-
gating stereotypes exacerbated it. Gawronski and colleagues hypothesize that the 
primary debiasing factor was “enhanced attention” to one rather than another 
set of stimuli (2008: 375). However, Johnson, Kopp, and Petty (2016) argued that 
“more meaningful” forms of stereotype negation may be effective. Specifically, 
they found that responding “No! That’s wrong!” to stereotypes reduced bias. 
They also found that this “meaningful negation” most effectively reduced im-
6. lai et al. (2016) found that five minutes of counterstereotype training initially reduced 
implicit prejudice, but effects dissipated after several hours. However, Kawakami and colleagues 
(2000) already found that a mere five minutes of training (in contrast to 45) was too brief.
7. Cf. Calanchini Gonsalkorale, Sherman, and Klauer’s (2013) replication of Kawakami et al. 
(2000) using generic positive and negative words, rather than stereotype- related terms.
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plicit bias among individuals who were already strongly motivated to be unbi-
ased. I highlight Gawronski and Johnson’s studies because both exemplify how 
the mere fact of exposure to stereotypes (or counterstereotypes) is insufficient 
to affect implicit bias. The effects also depend on what participants are doing, i.e., 
how they attend, feel, think, and act in response to the stimuli in front of them. 
Such facts are, I’ll argue, incredibly important for understanding how biases are 
learned, unlearned, and possibly relearned, and thus for addressing empirical, 
practical, and institutional concerns about debiasing.
In addition to reducing bias on indirect computer measures, these proce-
dures also influence deliberative decision- making, unreflective social behavior, 
and test performance.
Deliberative decisions. In Kawakami, Dovidio, and van Kamp (2005; 2007), 
participants practiced gender counterstereotype training, pairing men’s faces 
with words like “sensitive” and women’s faces with words like “strong.” In the 
2007 study, participants next evaluated four job applications (résumés and cover 
letters) for a leadership position. All applicants were qualified, but two were 
men and two were women. With no training, only 35% of participants chose a 
woman. After counterstereotype training, however, 61% chose a woman.
There is, however, a “catch.” The debiasing effect occurred only when the 
task of choosing the best candidate came after a prior “filler” task evaluating 
the candidates’ traits. When participants had to choose the best candidate im-
mediately after debiasing, only 37% chose a woman. evidently, participants rec-
ognized that the researchers were trying to debias them, and tried to correct for 
this influence by deliberately responding in more stereotypical ways, at least at 
first. After the opportunity to explicitly resist the training, they then responded 
in counterstereotypical ways. Thus, individuals might express resentment im-
mediately after a debiasing intervention, although the effects nevertheless emerge 
later. The researchers also recommend pursuing less “heavy- handed” strategies 
to avoid temporary backlash (Kawakami, Dovidio, & van Kamp 2007: 151).
Unreflective social behavior. One less heavy- handed intervention may be 
approach/avoidance training. In Kawakami, Phills, Steele, and Dovidio (2007), 
white and Asian participants repeatedly pulled a joystick toward themselves 
when they saw black faces and pushed it away when they saw white faces. In 
pulling the joystick in, for example, it is as if participants are bringing the per-
ceived image closer, or approaching it. In some cases, participants were explicitly 
told that moving the joystick signified approaching the image. In other cases, the 
images were “masked” and shown so quickly participants didn’t notice them, 
and instead believed that they were just responding to the words “approach” or 
“avoid.” Both explicit and subliminal forms of training significantly reduced im-
plicit bias on the IAT. Moreover, subliminal approach training influenced social 
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behavior, leading white and Asian participants to sit closer to a black interlocu-
tor and face him head- on, rather than at an indirect angle.8
Test performance. These training procedures also help individuals cope with 
the stereotypes that might negatively affect themselves. Building on Kawakami, 
Steel, Cifa, Phills, and Dovidio (2008), Forbes and Schmader (2010) found that 
women who were subtly trained to associate the phrase “women are good at” 
with math- related words exhibited improved performance on tests of working 
memory and math questions from the GRe. The benefits of this gender- math 
counterstereotype training were visible even after a 24– 30- hour delay.
Taken together, the evidence suggests that counterstereotype and approach 
training significantly affect individuals’ cognitive, affective, and behavioral dis-
positions along a number of key dimensions. For the many individuals (like my-
self) who harbor biases despite being sincerely committed to fairness and egali-
tarianism, these procedures would seem to be a boon, a concrete way to bring 
our unreflective dispositions more into line with our considered commitments.
3. The General Reception of Counterstereotype  
and Approach Training
Kawakami’s original 2000 study is widely cited as a sort of “existence proof” that 
implicit biases are at least capable of change, but this research is just as widely 
dismissed as lacking direct import for the broader struggle against prejudice, 
discrimination, and inequality. I find this puzzling. Why aren’t these training 
procedures on the table as one important thing that those of us concerned to 
combat discrimination should be doing, and making available to everyone on 
a large scale? Why aren’t researchers testing these procedures in the field? Poli-
cymakers already “spend billions of dollars annually on interventions aimed at 
prejudice reduction in schools, workplaces, neighborhoods, and regions beset 
8. The effects of non- subliminal training on social behavior were not tested. See also Phills, 
Kawakami, Tabi, Nadolny, and Inzlicht (2011). See van Dessel, de Houwer, Roets, and Gast (2016) 
for additional references, useful theoretical discussion about underlying mechanisms, and some 
notable failures to replicate the effects of purely subliminal approach training on IAT scores. Wen-
nekers, Holland, Wigboldus, and van Knippenberg (2012) reduced prejudice by having partici-
pants nod in response to typical Moroccan names and shake their heads in response to typical 
Dutch names. Notably, Wennekers (2013) found that nodding in response to only 50% of the Mo-
roccan stimuli, instead of 100%, failed to significantly reduce implicit prejudice. This suggests 
that consistency in responses is important (see Olson & Fazio 2006: 431), which is a reason to be 
skeptical about how effectively we can replicate these lab- based interventions in daily life (Section 
3). We cannot expect to approach or have universally positive interactions with every member of 
every social group, stigmatized or otherwise.
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by intergroup conflict” (Paluck & Green 2009: 340). Much of this money and time 
is spent on interventions, such as diversity training, the effectiveness of which 
“remains largely unknown” (Paluck & Green 2009: 359). Yet nobody, to my 
knowledge, has seriously advocated implementing these training procedures in 
these contexts, not even on an exploratory, experimental basis.
Instead, Kawakami’s supposedly “laborious 480- trial procedure” (Olson & 
Fazio 2006: 431), which requires “many, many repetitions to learn nonstereo-
typical responses” (Stewart & Payne 2008: 1343), is often cited as a point of con-
trast when researchers discover a less intensive, less demanding intervention 
(see also Mendoza et al. 2010: 512– 3, 521). Many continue to assume that implicit 
biases are, despite the aforementioned evidence for their partial malleability, 
still a little too rigid, inaccessible, and unwieldy for changing them directly to 
be a viable strategy. I will, in Sections 4– 7, explore their grounds for pessimism 
about counterstereotype and affirmation training in greater depth. As it stands, 
researchers are committed to finding interventions that require less time and ef-
fort, and which work primarily by leaving the biases in place but mitigating their 
effects on judgment and behavior.
Nevertheless, many acknowledge that Kawakami’s research might have in-
direct practical import. The trend is to assume that these studies are relevant only 
insofar as they can be replicated in applied, “real- world” contexts. Social scientists 
and philosophers evidently take for granted that individuals will not actually en-
gage in these very training procedures (or close variants of them), and that we must 
therefore figure out how individuals can mimic these procedures in everyday life, 
for example, by approaching and having positive interactions with counterstereo-
typical individuals.9 even Phills and colleagues seem to assume that these training 
procedures are not themselves good candidates for actual interventions:
The next step for this research, however, would be to test these proce-
dures in a more applied setting. For example, one possible strategy is to 
have schools implement morning welcome activities in which students 
from different ethnic/racial groups approach one another. (2011: 208)
This sort of welcoming activity may be beneficial, but it strikes me as odd to 
construe it as somehow in competition with the computer- based training proce-
9. Wennekers writes that “repeatedly approaching out- group members and noticing that 
nothing bad happens may make you less likely to avoid them,” (2013: 85) and Schneider concludes 
that, “Obviously, in everyday life people are not likely to get such deliberate training, but it is cer-
tainly possible that those who routinely have positive and nonstereotypic experiences from people 
with stereotyped groups will replace a cultural stereotype with one that is more individual and 
generally less negative.” (2004: 423). Philosophers such as Alcoff (2010: 131– 132), Anderson (2010: 
152; 2012: 167– 170), and Huebner (2016: Section 4.2) draw similar conclusions.
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dures. It would probably be wise for students to work through those procedures 
before the relevant social activity, to nudge those interactions toward going off 
on the right foot. That is, if there are ways to promote or replicate these interven-
tions in everyday life, so much the better. But why assume that the “next step” 
is simply to pursue the everyday- life strategies to the exclusion of the training 
procedures? Why not pursue them in conjunction? The assumption that these 
procedures are relevant only insofar as they can be replicated in everyday life 
strikes me as roughly analogous with, say, making the discovery that a certain 
targeted sports drill improves athletic importance, and then concluding from 
this discovery that the thing to do is scrimmage more. The evidence discussed in 
Section 2 suggests that a certain sort of intervention does reduce prejudice, but it 
is interpreted as signifying that another sort of intervention— which is for some 
reason taken to be more authentic and mutually exclusive with the first— might 
reduce prejudice.
What I find additionally puzzling about this pattern of inference is that we 
already have decades of evidence about attempts to debias through everyday 
social activities. Further indirect, lab- based evidence does not seem especially 
informative. Attempts to change attitudes through social interaction (the contact 
hypothesis) have a long history, and evidence for their success is substantial 
but complicated.10 For example, Henry and Hardin (2006) found that intergroup 
contact generally reduced explicit reports of prejudice, but that its effects on im-
plicit prejudice were mediated by the social status of the participants. Contact re-
duced the implicit prejudice of black Americans toward white, but not of white 
toward black, and it reduced the implicit prejudice of lebanese Muslims toward 
lebanese Christians, but not of Christians toward Muslims. In these and other 
cases, the higher- status group’s implicit biases were unaffected. Moreover, the 
conditions conducive to effective contact (namely, cooperating toward a com-
mon goal, on terms of equal social status) are in some contexts extremely dif-
ficult to construct and maintain. A rival “conflict” hypothesis seeks to explain 
how contact often amplifies intergroup animosity. Thus the morning welcome 
activities envisioned by Phills and colleagues might, across a range of contexts, 
exacerbate rather than undermine bias. even when contact reduces prejudice, 
the effect sizes tend to be relatively small.
I by no means wish to discount the importance of actual intergroup interac-
tion, whether for the specific aim of debiasing or for broader concerns related 
to social justice. I strongly agree with theorists such as Danielle Allen (2004) 
and elizabeth Anderson (2010) that ongoing de facto segregation between so-
cial groups is a major cause of inequality and an impediment to just democratic 
10. See, e.g., Dixon et al. (2012), Kelly, Faucher, and Machery (2010), Pettigrew and Tropp 
(2006), Putnam (2007), and Shook and Fazio (2008).
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decision- making, and that, therefore, integration and interaction between mem-
bers of diverse social groups are deeply important aims. However, given the 
large body of evidence on the limitations and occasionally counterproductive 
effects of intergroup contact, it seems to me that we should actively pursue 
complementary strategies that nudge these interactions in the right direction, 
and perhaps amplify their debiasing effects. Maybe if individuals volunteered 
for a little approach training beforehand, intergroup encounters would be more 
likely to start off on the right foot and unfold in more positive ways. What really 
puzzles me, in other words, is that these training procedures are interpreted as 
evidence for the debiasing power of social contact rather than as evidence for 
ways of improving the debiasing power of social contact.
That there are important connections between approach training and social 
contact is clear. Phills and colleagues (2011: 198) found that approach training 
led to “psychological closeness” of a distinctive sort, by strengthening white 
and Asian participants’ associations between blacks and self- related words (“I,” 
“me,” “self,” etc.). This increased self- identification with blacks evidently played 
a significant role in reducing anti- black bias. In a sense, then, this research is 
in keeping with the age- old strategy of reducing prejudice by breaking down 
“us” versus “them” dichotomies. Approach training may be, in effect, the contact 
hypothesis in a bottle. This is not to say that approach training or its effects are 
equivalent to actual intergroup contact or its effects. like most “distillations” or 
“lab- designed imitations” of naturally occurring phenomena, there are impor-
tant differences between the bottled version and the “real thing,” which usually 
means that the bottled version is worse in many respects— and better in others. 
There are myriad potential benefits of having cooperative, respectful intergroup 
interactions that cannot be achieved merely by moving a joystick back and forth. 
There is, however, at least one considerable advantage to the computer- based 
training procedures: we can guarantee that 100% of the trials are counter- biasing 
in the procedures, but not in unscripted interactions in everyday environments.11
It seems to me that these very training procedures, or variants of them that 
emerge in response to further empirical developments, are themselves among 
the activities we should all be engaged in to work to undermine the biases we 
harbor that can do harm to others and ourselves. Rather than portray everyday- 
life strategies as the more authentic alternative to counterstereotype and affir-
mation training, I suspect these two sorts of intervention are apt to be mutu-
ally reinforcing; I will say more about why in Sections 4 and 7 (see also Madva 
2016b). In addition to the everyday- life strategies, I believe we should eventu-
ally make versions of these training procedures widely available, and begin to 
consider how institutions might incorporate them into broader antidiscrimina-
11. On the importance of consistency, see Footnote 8.
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tion strategies. Of course, before making serious investments of hope and re-
sources, further research could test the effects of these procedures in the field. I 
highlight outstanding empirical questions in what follows. However, research-
ers are not seriously considering such research. So far, investigations of how 
prejudice- reduction techniques affect behavior outside the lab, such as Devine 
and colleagues (2012), have focused only on how to mimic these procedures in 
everyday- life interactions, rather than using these procedures themselves. Why?
4. 1st Empirical Concern: The Relearning Worry
The most commonly cited concern, about these and almost every other individual- 
level debiasing strategy, is how long the effects last.12 While evidence suggests 
that these procedures reduce bias for at least a day (Kawakami et al. 2000; Forbes 
& Schmader 2010) or a week (Hu et al. 2015), nobody has, to my knowledge, 
tested just how long people stay debiased after counterstereotype or approach 
training. The durability of these procedures is fundamentally an open empirical 
question. The failure to perform these studies is partly explained by the fact that 
longitudinal interventions are expensive and unwieldy.13 However, based on 
personal correspondence with several researchers, I worry that pessimism about 
the durability of debiasing may be another contributing factor. Moreover, some 
write as if the absence of evidence is evidence of absence. For example, Mendoza 
and colleagues (2010: 520) insinuate that certain studies that detected effects last-
ing days also failed to detect effects lasting any longer, whereas tests on the long- 
term durability of these training procedures have simply not been done.
The basic conjecture underlying the relearning worry is that as soon as peo-
ple step outside of the lab, they will be bombarded with stereotypes all over 
again, and reacquire (or learn anew) all of their biases. For example, Mendoza 
and colleagues write that attempts “to change underlying representations of 
racial groups . . . may be more difficult to maintain upon reexposure to soci-
etal stereotypes outside the laboratory” (2010: 520; cf. Huebner 2016: 71). Call 
this the bombardment basis for the relearning worry. This conjecture seems to be 
premised upon a certain commonsensical view of prejudices and stereotypes, 
according to which we initially acquire these undesirable attitudes through re-
peated exposure to negative representations of social groups. This is intuitively 
a gradual process, whereby our biases slowly get stronger, reinforced by ever 
more prejudice- promoting experiences. Intuitively, the outcome of this gradual 
12. See, e.g., Devine et al. (2012: 1267– 1268), lai, Hoffman, and Nosek (2013: 320– 321), Men-
doza et al. (2010: 520– 521) and Wennekers (2013: 130– 131).
13. In conversation, Brandon Stewart suggested that another contributing factor is an aca-
demic stigma against excessively applied and insufficiently theoretical research.
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process is that prejudices will become deeply ingrained in our minds and subse-
quently be difficult to change. So, the thought goes, won’t this process just repeat 
itself after debiasing?
Since the relevant studies have not been done (for example, Mendoza and 
colleagues do not cite evidence to support their conjecture about the effects of 
reexposure to stereotypes after debiasing), pessimists must look elsewhere for 
indirect support. One source of pessimism might be evidence from develop-
mental psychology that implicit biases tend to form early in childhood and per-
sist through adulthood (Olson & Dunham 2010). While explicit biases improve 
as children get older— adults are less likely to report racial preferences than 
10- year- olds, and 10- year- olds are less likely to report such preferences than 
6- year- olds— implicit biases remain surprisingly stable.14 This might suggest 
that debiasing effects are likely temporary: whatever causal forces are keeping 
implicit biases stable over time (presumably some combination of psychological 
and environmental factors) will still be there after debiasing, and will lead indi-
viduals to revert back to their prior biased state.
This research, however, consists of longitudinal observation without ex-
perimental intervention. It suggests that, in the ordinary course of things, im-
plicit biases typically don’t change in lasting ways; it is silent about whether 
they can. The developmental research is, moreover, ultimately inconsistent with 
the commonsense view of prejudice. Infants seem to pick up these biases very 
quickly without years of being bombarded with stereotypes. Kawakami and oth-
ers’ research, in turn, undermines the commonsense view about the resilience of 
bias in adulthood, suggesting that individuals can reduce these biases, at least 
temporarily. The question is whether the changes will last. So on these points 
the commonsense view of prejudice, which underlies the relearning worry, is 
completely off- base. Why, then, should we be so worried about the additional 
commonsensical pronouncement that getting bombarded with stereotypes out-
side the lab will undo the effects of debiasing? It is common for social scientists, 
philosophers, and activists nowadays to speak about how much we’ve learned 
about prejudice in recent decades, but I wonder if pessimism about the durabil-
ity of debiasing is itself a holdover of the old- fashioned views that all this research 
is supposed to have debunked.
In addition to developmental studies, another source of pessimism is evi-
dence that adult exposure to certain forms of “mass media” increases bias. For 
example, implicit racial biases increase after listening to violent rap music (but 
not pop; Rudman & lee 2002), and after watching television clips in which white 
14. The stability I mean here is not within- individual test- retest reliability, but overall demo-
graphic (between- individual) trends. A wide variety of transient, context- specific variables affect 
how particular individuals score on measures of implicit bias on particular occasions, such as the 
“mass- media” effects I describe shortly. See also Section 5 and Madva (2016a).
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characters display subtle, nonverbal bias toward black characters (Weisbuch, 
Pauker, & Ambady 2009). Suppose that, in keeping with the bombardment ba-
sis, individuals will encounter many more of these stereotype- promoting than 
stereotype- disconfirming phenomena once they leave the lab. The prediction 
that individuals will inevitably relearn their biases depends on a further as-
sumption: that their biases will, over time, come to reflect whatever bombards 
them most. But we know that this picture of the human mind— as an empty head 
that simply gets filled with the preponderance of information it encounters— is 
utterly false. If it were true, it would mean that the mind was an extremely ac-
curate mirror of nature, in the sense that our inductively grounded beliefs and 
expectations would be closely calibrated to the actual regularities we encounter. 
It is old news that we don’t work like that.15 We suffer from a profound confir-
mation bias, being more likely to seek out and attend to evidence that reinforces 
what we already believe than to consider contravening evidence. And our beliefs 
often persevere in the face of the contravening evidence that we do happen to 
consider. It is just false that our biases depend primarily on the mere preponder-
ance of “evidence” we take in, in the form of magazine covers, news stories, or 
what have you. Typically, belief perseverance, the confirmation bias, and a host 
of other cognitive dispositions help to create and sustain our biases, but there is 
reason to think that these dispositions can also be recruited to serve more egali-
tarian ends.
Rather than being empty heads with no filters on incoming information, 
what we notice and how we interpret it is profoundly shaped by our implicit 
and explicit goals.16 Aims that typically work in favor of stereotyping include the 
desire to protect one’s self- esteem (e.g., by putting down another group) and to 
see the world as a fundamentally just place where people deserve their lot. Aims 
that often work against stereotyping include a desire to be egalitarian, to treat a 
person as an individual, and to take an outsider’s perspective on things. Which 
goals we have makes all the difference to what we notice and how we interpret 
whatever bombards us. If we respond to a stereotypical representation by think-
ing, “There’s a grain of truth in that,” then we might just be trying to feel better 
about ourselves— and reinforcing our biases. If, instead, we respond by shout-
ing, “No! That’s Wrong!” then that very same exposure to a stereotypical represen-
tation could weaken our biases and reinforce our egalitarianism.
Once we become sufficiently debiased, then, and insofar as we are motivated 
to stay that way, many of these psychological dispositions might now operate to 
maintain our debiases. even if we encounter disproportionately more stereotypi-
cal than counterstereotypical representations, we might pay disproportionately 
15. See Madva (2016b: Section 3) for further discussion.
16. See Kunda and Spencer (2003), Moskowitz (2010), and Uhlmann, Brescoll, and Machery 
(2010).
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less attention to the stereotypes, and perhaps “meaningfully negate” or other-
wise discount them when we notice them. Of course, this is speculative. My aim 
is not to convince you through a priori speculation that debiased individuals 
will never relearn their biases, but to emphasize that, in the absence of any di-
rect evidence to the contrary, the burden is on the pessimist to explain why the 
relearning worry is daunting enough to support the widespread perception that 
these training procedures lack direct, practical import. None of this is to say that 
we won’t also have to work at being egalitarian, or that retraining our biases 
through these simplistic procedures will instantly endow us with all the right 
cognitive dispositions— but why shouldn’t these procedures be part of this over-
all process? One simple thing we can do to stay debiased is form concrete plans 
for how to react to stereotype bombardment. For example, “When I see a stereo-
typical representation, I will go to my window and shout, I’m mad as hell and I’m 
not going to take it anymore!” and, “When I see a counterstereotypical exemplar, I 
will cheer, Shine on, you crazy diamond!”
Moreover, although there is no direct evidence demonstrating the durability 
of debiasing, indirect evidence to support optimism is growing. Devine and col-
leagues (2012) taught participants five strategies they could employ in daily life 
to reduce their racial biases. This intervention led to partial reductions of bias 
that lasted at least eight weeks.17 evidence also suggests that counterstereotypi-
cal teachers can reduce their students’ biases. Dasgupta and Asgari (2004) found 
that first- year undergraduate women who took multiple classes with woman 
math and science professors showed less implicit gender bias after one year (see 
also Rudman Ashmore, and Gary 2001; Stout, Dasgupta, Hunsinger, & McMa-
nus 2011). Presumably, the participants in these studies were simultaneously 
being bombarded with gender stereotypes every time they turned on the televi-
sion, or read a New York Times obituary of a woman rocket scientist that fore-
grounded her reputation as the world’s best Mom and an expert at making beef 
stroganoff.18 Yet their salient classroom experiences evidently “won out” over 
the media bombardment. So while I certainly agree that exposure to stereotypes 
in mass media tends to have pernicious effects, especially in the ordinary course 
of events that leads many of us to acquire biases in the first place, I find it highly 
unlikely that being bombarded with stereotypes is sufficient for individuals to 
17. This intervention, which did not include any targeted approach or counterstereotype 
training of the kind described in Section 2, tended to reduce but not eliminate bias. In light of the 
studies on alcoholism recovery that I discuss in the next paragraph, there is reason to think that 
such training procedures might enhance the effectiveness of Devine et al.’s (2012) daily- life strate-
gies. I asked one of the authors of this study why they did not include any approach or counterste-
reotype training, and the author didn’t know. My impression was that it simply hadn’t occurred 
to the researchers as a serious option.
18. See Sullivan (2013, April 1) for discussion and links to Martin’s (2013, March 30) obituary 
of Yvonne Brill.
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either learn or relearn their biases. A further, crucial set of variables revolves 
around how individuals react to what bombards them: their short- and long- term 
motivations and goals, their conscious thoughts, their background store of expe-
riences, and their unreflective patterns of attention, feeling, and action.
Perhaps the strongest evidence— albeit still indirect— for the durability of 
prejudice- reducing interventions comes from clinical research. Wiers, eberl, 
Rinck, Becker, and lindenmeyer (2011) found that patients recovering from 
alcoholism who, immediately prior to undergoing standard treatment, were 
trained to avoid images of alcohol (in four sessions lasting only 15 minutes each) 
were significantly less likely to relapse one year after being discharged, in com-
parison to patients who underwent no training or sham training.19 Of course, 
no one is making the absurd claim that moving a joystick back and forth will, 
all by itself, cure alcoholism.20 The point is that alcohol- avoidance training to-
gether with other forms of therapy tended to have much more durable effects 
than therapy alone. By the same token, I am not claiming that approach training 
will, all by itself, solve racism and end inequality. I am claiming that it is one 
thing we should be doing, together with everything else that we should be do-
ing. The most commonly cited reason to write off these training procedures is 
pessimism about durability, but such pessimism is, at this time, unwarranted. 
Wiers and colleagues’ research suggests that, if anything, these procedures en-
hance the durability of standard interventions (thus serving as another reminder 
that the question raised in Section 3, whether to engage in these very training 
procedures versus try to replicate them in daily life, represents a false choice). 
While I doubt that social prejudices are more difficult to dislodge than addictive 
impulses, we obviously cannot assume that approach training’s long- term ef-
fects on prejudice will be comparable to its demonstrated effects on alcoholism 
recovery. The long- term effects on prejudice are pressing empirical questions, 
which continue to go untested.
But suppose that the effects of debiasing are not permanent. How long would 
they have to last in order to be worthwhile? Suppose debiasing worked like den-
tal cleanings, and it was best to debias ourselves once or twice a year. Would a 
biannual trip to the debiaser be too much to ask? Would it be a counterproduc-
tive waste of time to debias ourselves once in a while even if we didn’t re- up 
quite as often as recommended? What if we can debias ourselves subliminally 
while engaged in other tasks?
In response to my question about visiting the debiaser twice a year, a referee 
for Ergo points out that I offer “no discussion of the points that would make 
this question answerable: Who would run these de- biasing clinics? How would 
19. These impressive findings were replicated by eberl et al. (2013).
20. See, e.g., lindgren et al. (2015).
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they be funded? How would people be made to go to them?” These are very 
important structural- institutional questions, to which I will return in Sections 6 
and 7, but I should clarify that I do not actually advocate coercing people into 
debiasing themselves if they don’t want to. I am concerned here with the many 
people, including myself, who harbor biases that we reflectively disavow— those 
of us who already want to be less biased than we are. As the relearning worry is 
the most commonly cited reason for skepticism about these training procedures 
(and about all individual- level debiasing strategies), I believe it deserves to be 
considered somewhat independently from complex questions about funding 
and implementation. My aim in the foregoing paragraph was to raise questions 
regarding just how long- lasting the effects have to be in order to be worthwhile, 
by appealing to an analogy with another sphere of life (dental visits) where we 
take for granted that a certain amount of upkeep is preferable. Many of us (in-
cluding those who have accessible, high- quality dental care) do not visit the den-
tist as often as we know we should. Other activities that we may not get around 
to often enough include cleaning the interior of the fridge, cleaning out closets, 
replacing smoke- detector batteries, etc. But it would be bizarre to infer from the 
fact that we don’t do them frequently enough to the conclusion that they are not 
worth doing at all, or to infer from the fact that the best effects are achieved by 
doing them a few times a year to the conclusion that there is no ethical or pru-
dential reason to do them ever. I do not purport to have an answer for exactly 
how long- lasting the effects of debiasing procedures would need to be in order 
to be worth doing, let alone to be considered morally obligatory, although it 
seems clear to me that permanence is an unreasonably high bar. All that said, 
I take the referee’s point that we cannot give fully satisfactory answers to these 
questions in the absence of a fuller picture of what implementing these interven-
tions would entail. I will hazard some conjectures about institutional implemen-
tation in Section 7, but the need for a fuller picture strikes me as all the more 
reason to initiate field studies to determine precisely what would be required in 
order to make these interventions as effective and durable as possible.
5. 2nd Empirical Concern: The “Context- Specificity” Worry
Another pervasive concern, which is more serious than the relearning worry in-
sofar as it has substantial, if still indirect, empirical support, is that the effects of 
debiasing might be highly context- specific. Might the effects only be visible in this 
particular lab, or on that particular test? Rather than unlearning their implicit 
biases, participants might just be learning to subtype— picking up on distinctive 
features of a specific type of individual (or context) within the larger group, such 
that their default impression of the group remains unchanged. Bouton (2002: 
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976) helpfully compares this phenomenon to learning that a familiar word has 
multiple meanings. For example, when we learn that the exclamation “Fire!” has 
a different meaning in a movie theater from in a shooting gallery, we do not un-
learn the first- learned meaning; we learn that the meaning of “Fire!” depends on 
its context. Subsequently, our default reaction to hearing someone shout “Fire!” 
will, in novel contexts, likely reflect the first- learned meaning rather than the 
second. Researchers can test whether debiasing has similarly context- dependent 
effects by exposing participants to novel exemplars of a social group in novel 
contexts, and seeing whether their automatic responses reflect their first impres-
sions of the group or their more recently learned counter- impressions.
Rydell and colleagues have done just this, in a series of studies using a differ-
ent implicit learning paradigm from Kawakami’s, and seem to have confirmed 
all of our worst fears.21 Generally speaking, it looks like first impressions are in-
credibly important: people’s initial salient exposure to a category member forms 
the backdrop for their future encounters with other category members. People 
can pick up quickly on the fact that novel category members do not fit the origi-
nal mold, but rather than revising their overall impression of the category, they 
glom onto specific, individuating features of the novel exemplar or its context. In 
Rydell and colleagues’ experiments, participants might read information about 
a person named Bob, seeing his photo against a blue computer screen. Suppose 
the information depicts Bob in a positive light and they form a positive impres-
sion of him. If they subsequently learn negative facts about Bob against a yellow 
computer screen, then they will eventually learn to automatically respond nega-
tively to Bob— but only when they encounter him against a yellow background. 
If they later see him against a blue background, or some novel color, their auto-
matic response will reflect their initial positive impression. Maybe what we have 
been interpreting as attitude malleability just reflects a kind of “fine- tuning” 
where people’s default attitudes toward groups remain stable but they learn 
about particular subtypes who don’t fit the mold.
The context- specificity worry has substantial empirical support, and is con-
sistent with decades of research on animal learning. As far as I can tell, however, 
the context- specificity of training in Kawakami’s paradigm has not been tested. 
And there is straightforward evidence internal to Kawakami and others’ studies 
to support the hypothesis that these sorts of debiasing will be less susceptible 
to those sorts of context effects. Their potential for context- generality is, in fact, 
a primary reason that I have honed in on these particular procedures out of the 
hundreds of studies that purport to reduce bias.
First, a number of these studies demonstrate how training in one “mode” or 
context can have effects on tests in a very different “mode.” Retraining implicit 
21. e.g., Rydell and Gawronski (2009). See Gawronski and Cesario (2013) for a review.
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stereotypes led to changes in implicit prejudice, even though the stimuli during 
training and testing were completely different (Gawronski et al. 2008). Sublimi-
nal approach training influenced participants in the context of taking an IAT but 
also in the context of interacting with another human being, with a face they 
had never seen before (Kawakami, Phills, Steele, & Dovidio 2007). Different sorts 
of approach training, which share nothing in common except their conceptual 
“approach- iness” led to reductions in bias, across an array of different mea-
sures (e.g., Phills et al. 2011). Math- gender counterstereotype training improved 
women’s performance on tests of working memory and math at least a day later 
(Forbes & Schmader 2010). Avoiding images of alcohol influenced implicit at-
titudes but also reduced the likelihood of relapse into alcoholism for at least one 
year (Wiers et al. 2011; eberl et al. 2013). There seems to be substantial evidence 
that these procedures generalize to precisely those novel contexts we’re most in-
terested in, including open- ended social interactions, tests, and actual decisions 
about whether to consume alcohol.
Second, it bears emphasizing that significant effects do not appear in Kawaka-
mi’s debiasing paradigm until after participants have already worked through 80 
trials, and it takes a few hundred more trials before participants approach a ceiling 
past which they cannot improve. It takes a reasonable amount of practice and ef-
fort over a significant number of trials. This suggests that the psychological forces 
at play are not quite so fast- learning (and perhaps context- specific or surface- level) 
as those involved in other interventions that have been found to reduce bias, such 
as Olson and Fazio’s (2006) finding that just 24 subliminal exposures to counterste-
reotypical pairings could reduce bias on one measure, or Blair, Ma, and lenton’s 
(2001) finding that 5 minutes of imagining a counterstereotypical woman could 
reduce gender bias on several measures. There is good reason to think that some-
thing more, or at least something different, is going on in Kawakami’s paradigm.
Third, in addition to the total number of trials necessary to reach significant 
effects, it is noteworthy that these forms of training involve robust (if rote) actions 
on the part of the participants. They are not just passively taking in information 
(as if watching Tv), but engaging in embodied counter- biasing behaviors. This 
contrasts with, say, Dasgupta and Greenwald’s (2001) paradigm of reminding 
participants of admired black individuals and infamous white individuals.22 
Recalling counterstereotypical exemplars may be a valuable exercise, but it is, 
plausibly, just making certain positive subtypes of the categories more acces-
sible, without actually changing participants’ attitudes about these categories. 
For that, more direct actions that actually challenge those attitudes might be nec-
essary, and they might have to be repeated a few hundred times.
22. A large- scale attempt to replicate this study did not find similarly strong effects (Joy- Gaba 
& Nosek 2012).
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My final response to the context- specificity worry is more nuanced, and I 
develop it in greater length elsewhere (Madva 2016a). Our aim is not the total 
erasure of “stereotypical associations” from our minds. There are many contexts 
where stereotypes ought to spring immediately to mind: in particular, when 
people are being treated in stereotypical ways and we must swiftly respond 
“No! That’s wrong!” We need to know about stereotypes in order to challenge 
them. I take this to mean that a certain sort of context- specificity is a good thing. 
We want to not use or think about stereotypes when they are irrelevant, and 
we want to think about them when they are relevant. Thus, evidence for the 
context- specificity of these sorts of interventions is not, just as such, a bad thing. 
It remains to be seen, of course, whether the sort of context- specificity that im-
plicit biases actually exhibit maps onto the sort of context- specificity that would 
be cognitively ideal. But research on the goal- dependence of stereotyping (Sec-
tion 4) suggests that if we adopt the right sorts of goals, we can make significant 
progress toward regulating our knowledge of stereotypes so that they are acti-
vated in the right contexts, and inhibited in the wrong ones.
6. Practical Unfeasibility
Suppose we grant, for the sake of argument, that these training procedures lead 
to reasonably durable, context- general reductions in bias. Critics of debiasing 
further justify their skepticism, in part, by referring to the fact that these suppos-
edly “laborious” procedures require “many, many repetitions” to be effective, 
thereby implying that they are somehow unfeasible. As if the sheer fact that they 
involve hundreds of trials is sufficient to establish that they are too onerous and 
labor- intensive to figure as a legitimate component of the larger struggle against 
prejudice and discrimination.
How labor- intensive are they? Reliably significant effects start appearing 
after about 160 trials, and many studies include just 200.23 The benefits of ad-
ditional training are still visible from 200 to 300 trials, but, following a classic 
“learning curve,” start to tail off around 400 (Kawakami et al. 2000: Study 3). At 
most, participants work through 480 trials. One upshot might be that even if we 
were only to work through 200 trials, we could become significantly less biased 
than we are, although we would not reach our maximally debiased potential. I 
take it that becoming less biased would presumably still be desirable, even if, for 
whatever reason, becoming as unbiased as psychologically possible were unfea-
sible. In any case, working through these hundreds of trials can be done on any 
23. Gawronski et al. (2008), Johnson, Kopp, and Petty (2016), and Wennekers et al. (2012; 
2013).
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personal computer, and done subliminally, perhaps merely by “liking” things 
on social media or playing Angry Birds. Working through all 480 trials takes 
about 45 minutes. Given the stakes, 45 minutes is nothing.24
I cannot seriously entertain the possibility that three- quarters of an hour of 
counterconditioning is too much to ask of ourselves. Maybe if we had to con-
stantly countercondition ourselves, this would become burdensome, but, in 
light of my responses to the relearning worry, I doubt this is an insurmountable 
threat. It is simply false that these training procedures are prohibitively labori-
ous or time- consuming. The widespread conviction that implicit biases are too 
deeply ingrained to uproot in any practically feasible way is undermined by 
these very findings.
This leads me to suspect that the prevalent misperception of debiasing as 
unfeasible may, ironically, be explained in part by a number of well- known 
social and cognitive biases, including, for example, the framing effect. Work-
ing through 480 trials to countercondition a bias, described in one context or 
“frame,” sounds like a lot (“many, many repetitions”). Yet the 45 minutes it takes 
to do so is miniscule in comparison to the tremendous resources that individu-
als, governments, schools, and businesses already devote to diversity initiatives 
and prejudice reduction, to say nothing of the time and resources devoted to the 
education of democratic citizens, and to teaching students foreign languages, 
musical instruments, sports, typing skills, and calculus. Compare it to the invest-
ments we make in dieting, therapy, and breaking bad habits and addictions. 45 
minutes is less time than many people spend per day on exercise and the honing 
of other skills. American children spend an average of four hours a day watching 
television, and an average of 135 hours a year learning foreign languages. They 
can’t give up one afternoon to try out a prejudice reduction strategy that has 
significant empirical support?
However, one might still think that debiasing is unfeasible because there are 
a lot of biases out there, and if it takes 20– 45 minutes to significantly reduce each 
of them, then how many hours will it take to fix them all? This is an important 
question to explore empirically, but it seems unfair and misguided to suggest 
24. See Section 1 for brief discussion of why the stakes here are high for everyone. An Ergo 
referee suggests that, like the question of durability (Section 4), the question whether 45 minutes 
of training is unfeasible cannot be answered unless the details of institutional implementation 
are filled in. As before, I grant that having a fuller picture in view will ultimately be necessary for 
assessing whether these procedures represent effective and morally acceptable tools to combat 
discrimination and inequality (I will say more about institutional implementation in Section 7). 
Nevertheless, I think that questions regarding how time- consuming and laborious the training 
procedures are deserve to be considered in their own right. For example, even if we stipulate for 
the sake of argument that these procedures can be institutionally sponsored in unobjectionable 
ways, a further question is whether they are so intensive that it would be unreasonable (or even 
just unlikely) for people to do them.
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that it poses a problem for the practical feasibility of debiasing. First, there seems 
to be another framing effect afoot, such that all implicit biases are being grouped 
together as the same problem— Implicit Bias— sharing a single underlying cause 
and requiring a single solution. But we would not, for example, rule out particu-
lar proposals for institutional interventions on the grounds that they won’t be 
equally effective at countering all possible forms of discrimination. The institu-
tional interventions that best address disadvantages for women in STeM fields 
may not overlap perfectly with those that best address racial discrimination in 
the criminal justice system, nor with those that best address the exclusion of in-
dividuals with disabilities from public spaces. Second, if debiasing ourselves in 
all relevant respects proves too laborious or time- consuming, then individuals 
can simply prioritize those biases that are more directly relevant to their daily 
lives, occupations, career goals, ethical commitments, or idiosyncratic hang- ups. 
We don’t, as it happens, all share exactly the same biases. The essential debiasing 
procedures for medical doctors, high- school guidance counselors, and airport 
security employees might differ greatly (or they might not). Third, if we can 
do this training subliminally, while wholly absorbed in other unrelated tasks 
(surfing the internet, social media, video games?), then it might be more or less 
irrelevant how many hours it would take to countercondition all the relevant bi-
ases. Fourth, evidence suggests that some debiasing procedures might general-
ize in important respects (Section 5). It then becomes a crucial empirical question 
which specific training procedures most efficiently achieve the broadest range 
of relevant effects. For example, perhaps we can train ourselves to automati-
cally “avoid prejudice” and “approach egalitarianism” in general. Glaser and 
Knowles (2008) found that individuals with implicit negative attitudes toward 
prejudice per se showed less racial bias. Perhaps we should practice approaching 
the voting booth and avoiding the status quo. In fact, I would argue that for ev-
ery broad structural reform we ought to prioritize in the struggle for social jus-
tice, there exist some individual- level reforms that we ought to prioritize because 
these individual reforms promote that structural reform (Madva 2016b: Section 1). To 
my mind, then, the question is not whether to employ individual- level training 
procedures. The (straightforwardly empirical) question is simply which specific 
attitudes or habits to target, given our broader social- political aims.
At this point, I can only speculate about additional factors that might drive 
an aversion to debiasing. In discussions with colleagues, students, or acquain-
tances, it sometimes seems as though people have a kneejerk negative response 
to the very idea, and thereafter confabulate reasons that justify their aversion.25 
25. Cf. Haidt (2001). My consideration of how social and cognitive biases might contribute to 
skepticism about debiasing also draws from speculations made about the role of cognitive biases 
in, e.g., the widespread indifference or failure to act in response to climate change, global poverty 
and hunger (Gifford 2011) and mass incarceration (Alexander 2012: 198). It is plausible that perva-
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To many the whole business seems creepy. It sounds like “thought police” and 
brainwashing. Talking seriously about counterconditioning inevitably calls up 
images of A Clockwork Orange, with Malcolm McDowell strapped to a chair, 
eyelids peeled back, being injected with giant needles full of nausea- inducing 
chemicals while he watches an endless stream of graphic violence. I hope it goes 
without saying that there is a lot to object to in the counterconditioning of A 
Clockwork Orange that I am not advocating here.
Of course, nobody is made uneasy by the prospects of having to actually 
go through the motions of training or retraining themselves in other contexts— 
memorizing flashcards, working through problem sets, practicing sports drills and 
musical scales. We might be instinctively averse to these activities because of their 
tedium, but not because of their creepiness. Many people also readily acknowledge 
the importance of cultivating good habits to living an ethically desirable life. In 
this way, the creepiness worry about debiasing might reflect a misunderstanding 
of the phenomenon in question. Perhaps counterconditioning would be problem-
atic if it involved indoctrinating alien beliefs and values. But the aim of debiasing 
is to help us better live up to and embody the commitments we already have, not 
to instill new ones. We are trying to fight back against the alien beliefs, values, and 
habits of thinking, feeling, and acting that we absorb from our systemically racist 
and sexist environments. That’s why genuine, full- blooded retraining has to be 
part of the discussion. Just like unlearning bad habits and learning new skills or 
languages, there simply has to be a central role for practice.26
What if debiasing has other, unforeseen consequences on our beliefs, values, 
and habits? Another worry associated with A Clockwork Orange is that debiasing 
interventions could have unexpected effects apart from bias reduction. Perhaps 
an intervention that effectively reduces a person’s biases will also make him 
chronically depressed or low in self- esteem, or maybe it will make him smugly 
self- satisfied and complacent. Whether there are problematic unintended con-
sequences of debiasing is an empirical question like any other, and should be 
explored, but I suspect that the benefits of reducing widespread discrimination 
will outweigh any such unforeseen costs. Of course, the potential for unforeseen 
costs is a risk for any intervention aimed at prejudice reduction, including the 
sive biases toward indifference, ignorance, and avoidance of the people and problems that are geo-
graphically, socially, or temporally “distant” from us contribute to the tendency to cast debiasing 
as unfeasible and ineffective. Of course, these are also precisely the sorts of biases that approach 
training might help us overcome.
26. In conversation, Michael Brownstein and Manuel vargas suggested that there might be 
some additional factors that explain (without really justifying) our kneejerk reluctance to debias-
ing, such as the alienating perception that the training requires using myself (or my mind or body) 
as a mere means to an end. Or our specific reluctance to debiasing might be due to how loaded 
racism, sexism, and prejudice are with ethical, political, and emotional baggage (in contrast to 
practicing problem sets and musical scales). Both seem highly plausible.
 Biased against Debiasing • 167
Ergo • vol. 4, no. 6 • 2017
interventions that do not strike people as creepy, and, indeed, is a ubiquitous 
risk for every kind of intervention in every kind of system— whether the system 
is psychological, biological, technological, social, ecological, etc. There does not 
seem to be a special problem of unanticipated side- effects for Kawakami’s pro-
cedures. Moreover, if, say, reducing white men’s biases will also lower their self- 
esteem, then the solution, I think, is to find alternative sources of self- esteem. 
Alternatively, if these interventions risk making us complacent, they should be 
coupled with strategies to resist complacency.27
In fact, objections about the creepiness of debiasing seem to seriously under-
appreciate the extent to which politicians and businesses are already trying to 
brainwash us using these very tools. In “How to like Yourself Better, or Choco-
late less” (2009), Irena ebert and colleagues found that even well- established 
implicit preferences for Haribo gummy bears versus Milka chocolate could be 
reversed— through a training procedure that, using different stimuli, was also 
found to enhance implicit self- esteem (see also Gibson 2008). Perhaps research 
on approach training partly inspired an MSNBC commercial campaign in 2010, 
which featured ads that paired the progressive- sounding slogan “lean Forward” 
with photos of its leading personalities, such as Rachel Maddow. In other words, 
the cat is already out of the bag. To object to debiasing on the grounds that it has 
a weird whiff of brainwashing is to fail to appreciate the extent to which massive 
resources are devoted to brainwashing us through precisely these means all the 
time. Why would we want big business to have a monopoly on brainwashing!28
In this vein, the creepiness worry seems especially dissonant with the bom-
bardment basis for the relearning worry. There seems to be a straightforward 
tension in arguing both that debiasing is pointless because we will just relearn 
the biases upon leaving the lab and that debiasing is creepy because it is like 
brainwashing. The anticipated relearning is presumably supposed to occur as 
a result of similarly brainwashing- esque procedures, such that our external en-
vironments imbue us with prejudiced beliefs, values, and habits that we would 
rather not have. It is puzzling that we would let ourselves become inured to the 
reality of powerful external forces brainwashing us all the time, but feel queasy 
about the opportunity to resist these forces and take matters into our own hands 
by debiasing ourselves.
I have also found, especially in discussions with students, that these proce-
dures may seem problematic because of the ways they use photos of real peo-
ple. Specifically, these procedures strike some as using people as mere means to 
help make ourselves less biased rather than treating these individuals as ends in 
themselves. However, the same could be said of most of the other interventions 
27. I say more about the unintended consequences of debiasing in Madva (2016b: Section 5).
28. Thanks to Katie Gasdaglis for discussion on this point.
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on offer, e.g., reflecting on infamous white individuals to drive down a prefer-
ence for whites. Perhaps using fictional individuals or computer- generated faces 
could circumvent this worry. (Wennekers, 2013, found that approaching faces 
and avoiding images of closets reduced prejudice.) But perhaps such procedures 
would still seem objectionable because they “use” racial whiteness and black-
ness to reduce our prejudices. If we take this concern seriously, however, then 
efforts to replicate these interventions in everyday life are far more troubling 
than lab- based versions. Bringing whites into contact with blacks for the sake of 
reducing prejudice seems a much clearer case of using people as means. Frankly, 
I doubt that any prejudice- reduction technique with a fighting chance at efficacy 
will completely avoid raising this concern.29 Perhaps the best I can say here is 
that anyone who finds these procedures objectionable on these grounds should 
not be required to do them (this is easy for me to say, as I believe that no one 
should be required to do them).
I suspect that one of the most significant biases driving kneejerk pessimism 
about debiasing is the extent to which these studies implicate us as individuals. If 
individuals can really take their implicit biases into their own hands, that means 
I can do so, and if I can, then, other things being equal, I probably should. But 
if I can tell myself a plausible story about how it is a massive social- structural 
problem that cannot be solved at the individual level, then I do not have to feel 
bad for failing to take steps to improve myself. The primary oversight in this 
sort of self- deflecting response is the failure to appreciate that, even if changing 
ourselves as individuals won’t directly change the whole world, these biases 
are nevertheless leading us to treat the other individuals we encounter (and our-
selves) in morally problematic ways. It is imperative that each of us ask our-
selves, as Barack Obama implored in response to Trayvon Martin’s shooting, 
“Am I wringing as much bias out of myself as I can? Am I judging people as 
much as I can, based on not the color of their skin, but the content of their char-
acter?” Implicit bias is as much a genuinely ethical problem as it is a political one; 
we as individuals are regularly failing to treat the other individuals with whom 
we interact as we ought. The problem is not just “out there” in the sociopolitical 
ether, but embodied and enacted in the myriad subtle and not- so- subtle ways we 
treat each other. Calling it political can be a way of forgetting that it’s ethical, too.
Another source of kneejerk pessimism might have to do with how stupid 
or brainless these interventions seem.30 There is a certain fantasy that the hard 
29. See, e.g., Anderson (2010: Chapter 8) on the bleak prospects of colorblind strategies to 
reduce racial prejudice and inequality.
30. “Indeed,” write Forbes and Schmader about their counterstereotype training, “it is almost 
shocking to think that having someone pair a basic activity, such as walking, with math would 
be sufficient to both alter the nature of a stereotype and free up subsequent working memory re-
sources when performing in the domain” (2010: 13).
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problems in our lives must be overcome by some deep, cathartic experience, or 
via some profound insight into human nature. In personal correspondence, Mi-
randa Fricker made the similar suggestion that these studies might be perceived 
as a threat to our moral depth and stability. We like to think that our virtues as 
well as our vices “run deep.” I wonder whether this sort of desire for depth isn’t 
responsible, in part, for the continued resistance to accepting that less sophis-
ticated habits of thinking, feeling, and acting make significant causal contribu-
tions to many of our personal and social ills, including prejudice and discrimina-
tion, and that these habits will have to be changed in order to remedy those ills.
In the context of fighting sexism and racism, the desire- for- deep- answers might 
manifest in the conviction that we must understand Marx’s critique of capitalism, 
Foucault’s analysis of power, and MacKinnon’s account of discrimination before 
we can get serious about combating large- scale social ills. I agree that we must 
understand these analyses. We must take a hard look at the underlying structures 
of power and oppression, and work to change them, but there is no inconsistency 
in combating prejudice on personal and political fronts concurrently. The desire- 
for- deep- answers may partly inspire the critique of debiasing, which I discuss in 
the next section, as too simplistic and individualistic. How could a simple thing 
like changing an individual’s prejudices combat this incredibly complex power 
structure? (The framing effect may be at work here as well.)
Perhaps another concern, roughly to do with intersectionality, is that just 
approaching blacks and avoiding whites with a joystick is problematically over-
simplified in contrast to the inherent complexity of social identity. I think this 
point is basically right. In a similar vein, the pervasive, racially biased habits 
explored by theorists such as Allen (2004), Alcoff (2006), and Sullivan (2006) and 
are far richer and more complex— psychologically, socially, historically, and 
symbolically— than those involved in Kawakami’s debiasing procedures. My 
response is to invoke an analogy with linguistic fluency (Madva 2012). Memo-
rizing vocabulary and grammar rules is not the same as becoming fluent in a 
second language. But we need to memorize vocabulary and learn a bunch of 
rules before becoming truly fluent. Kawakami’s simplistic procedures may be 
the anti- prejudicial equivalent of memorizing flashcards. These are the basics, 
which put us in a better position to actually act in unbiased ways in the everyday 
world, with all its inherent complexity.
7. Individualism
Although many philosophers, social scientists, and activists agree that the per-
vasion of biased “microbehaviors” contributes to macro- level injustices, many 
are skeptical of interventions that seek to change these microbehaviors by coun-
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terconditioning individuals’ implicit biases. We should, they argue, instead fo-
cus on the substantive, structural factors that perpetuate discrimination and in-
equality. I agree that social structures such as de facto segregation (Section 3) and 
pervasively biased mass media (Section 4) are significant sources of injustice, 
which, at least in the ordinary course of things, tend to reinforce our biases. I 
wholeheartedly agree, therefore, that profound structural interventions are nec-
essary, and I take up concerns about the putatively individualistic focus of debi-
asing efforts in greater depth in a companion essay (2016b). Far from being in 
competition, however, training procedures like Kawakami’s may be integral to 
the successful implementation of broader structural reforms.
Institutional efforts to combat discrimination and promote diversity, such as 
race- based affirmative action and the integrationist rezoning of school and vot-
ing districts, continue to be controversial. Support for these policies tends to be 
deeply divided along racial lines (Drake 2014). In American courts, the overarch-
ing pattern in recent years has been to roll back existing structural interventions 
because they purportedly amount to “reverse” discrimination (e.g., Parents In-
volved v. Seattle 2007; Schuette v. Coalition 2013; Wal- Mart v. Dukes 2011). I frankly 
fail to see how, in the contemporary political climate, structural interventions 
for addressing bias, discrimination, and inequality have cornered the market on 
brass- tacks pragmatism. Apart from asking how effective debiasing will be, we 
might also ask, how much opposition will there be? We can make counterstereotype 
and approach training widely available to individuals without overhauling so-
cial structures in potentially contentious ways. While we can weave these forms 
of debiasing into our institutions, we need not. These procedures will not live or 
die on the whims of lawmakers and judges. If we are speaking practically about 
the current state of US politics, then the individualist strand in debiasing might 
be a virtue rather than a vice. These training procedures can be defended in 
terms of the values and political ideals of those who object to institutional inter-
ventions as paternalistic or reverse- discriminatory: by making these procedures 
widely available, we can give individuals the free choice to take responsibility 
for debiasing themselves.
As opposition to affirmative action has grown (or at least held steady), and as 
the courts have struck down some historically influential defenses of the practice 
(e.g., by discounting the justification of affirmative action as a compensation for 
past injustice), theorists and activists have sought out alternative ethical and le-
gal grounds for it. Debiasing figures prominently among “new” justifications for 
affirmative action, as many claim that promoting members of underrepresented 
groups to positions of prominence will produce “debiasing agents,” counterste-
reotypical exemplars who debias their peers.31 Matters are likely not so simple. 
31. See Alcoff (2010), Anderson (2010), Jolls and Sunstein (2006), and Kang and Banaji (2006).
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If coworkers believe that others have been promoted ahead of them simply to 
satisfy a quota, they may resent what they (perhaps wrongly) perceive to be 
undue benefits, under- evaluate their performances in the future, and so on. For 
example, Kaiser and colleagues (2013) found that the mere presence of diversity- 
promoting structures can ironically lead some privileged individuals to become 
more discriminatory. Given such findings, we cannot assume that institutional 
interventions will have debiasing effects. Implementing them without sufficient 
attention to the motivations, interpretations, and biases of the individuals in-
volved can backfire, begetting heightened prejudice and discrimination. Fortu-
nately, we do not have to look far for psychological interventions that could 
mutually reinforce institutional change. Kawakami’s training procedures could 
provide the necessary psychological scaffolding to implement antidiscrimina-
tion initiatives without amplifying hostility; at the same time, integrationist 
initiatives like affirmative action might provide the necessary environmental 
scaffolding to reinforce the effects of training procedures (e.g., people will en-
counter counterstereotypes both during training and in the workplace, and have 
opportunities to have their debiased expectations confirmed). The fundamental 
answer to the individualist criticism is simple: implement debiasing on an insti-
tutional scale.
However, the prospect of institutional sponsorship of debiasing raises wor-
ries of its own— again calling up images of “thought police” and mandatory 
brainwashing— but these worries are, again, misguided and unfair. They are 
misguided because they fail to appreciate the extent to which debiasing is a re-
sponse to objectionable forms of brainwashing that are already operative, and be-
cause they wrongly construe the aim of debiasing to be the manipulation of our 
beliefs, or the implantation in our minds of external goals and values (Section 
6). Instead, the aim of debiasing is ultimately to bring our unreflective habits of 
thinking, feeling, and acting into accord with the beliefs and values we already 
endorse, or at least claim to. These worries are also unfair, because institutional 
sponsorship need not take the controversial form of, e.g., a universal debiasing 
mandate. There are numerous “nudges” that institutions can employ to encour-
age debiasing without making it obligatory, such as by auto- enrolling employ-
ees in a debiasing program and allowing them to opt out.
Before concluding, let me return to the series of questions about institutional 
implementation raised by an Ergo referee at the end of Section 4. The referee 
argues that questions about durability, feasibility, and the scope of our norma-
tive obligations to reduce our biases are unanswerable without a better sense of 
how people would be compelled to debias themselves, how debiasing would be 
funded, who would be in charge, etc. First, I do not think people should be com-
pelled to engage in these procedures, nor do I think individuals or institutions 
should be permitted to subliminally debias employees or consumers without 
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their knowing. Perhaps laws will need to be passed to outlaw such practices. 
Given that politicians and corporations may already be allocating significant re-
sources toward brainwashing us through comparable means, the need for such 
regulations, or for the enforcement of existing regulations, may be overdue.32 
Second, regarding funding, I believe that the same individuals and institutions 
(schools, charities, businesses, governments) who now spend billions of dollars 
on diversity training and other prejudice- reduction techniques (i.e., on interven-
tions that already aim to influence us but have not generally been shown to do 
so effectively) should allocate some of those resources to studying these training 
procedures. I don’t find anything in- principle problematic about members of 
these institutions funding and spearheading such studies. What I find problem-
atic is that many existing interventions are pursued with no serious concern for 
or assessment of their effectiveness, often just to “check a box” to mark comple-
tion and thereby prevent lawsuits. Third, regarding who runs the debiasing, I 
believe that much of the precise nature of these interventions should be driven 
by the results of empirical research, but the decision- making should also be, as 
much as possible, transparent to and within the power of participants them-
selves. Individuals should be fully aware what they are signing up for, and even 
free to choose exactly which of their own attitudes, if any, they’d like to change.
Here are some concrete examples, which are highly speculative in terms of 
details but exemplify the kinds of implementation I believe would be appropri-
ate. First, some internet browsers allow users to install “add- ons,” e.g., programs 
that block advertisements. Perhaps we could develop debiasing add- ons which 
individuals choose to install, and then freely toggle on and off, such that when-
ever they click on a link or “like” something online, they are (perhaps sublimi-
nally, perhaps consciously) presented with certain images (members of other 
social groups, healthy foods, etc.). Individuals could presumably even choose 
or upload the precise sets of images involved. (Again, it would be wrong and 
should be illegal to flash such subliminal images without individuals’ know-
ing, voluntary participation.) Second, it might be possible to develop and make 
freely available otherwise fun, ordinary video games that include debiasing 
components. Consider, for example, a dancing game, in which players practice 
approach- oriented dance moves in response to images of individuals from other 
social groups; or a word- unscrambling game (like Boggle) in which players see 
images of outgroup members and then have to unscramble letter- strings like 
“flyndire” into “friendly.” Third, many institutions require their members to 
take online courses about, for example, sexual harassment. Perhaps there could 
32. The UK and Australia ban subliminal advertising (BBC News 2009, September 28). An-
other major obstacle to subliminal advertising is fear of public- relations backlash, as Facebook 
experienced after publishing a study showing that varying the content of users’ news feeds could 
influence their emotions (Albergotti 2014).
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be a (completely voluntary!) option to subliminally debias oneself during such 
online training, or, after the training is over, to play a debiasing game. Fourth, 
many occupations require individuals to engage in continuing education, but in-
dividuals have a range of options about precisely which courses to take. Perhaps 
one of the options could be a mini- course that first explains the nature and causes 
of contemporary prejudice, then explains the research behind these debiasing 
procedures, and then gives participants the option to engage in them— again, 
allowing participants to choose which sets of stimuli they’d like to work with, 
perhaps after they have tested themselves to uncover their own idiosyncratic 
biases. Of course, whether these interventions would be feasible or effective are 
open- ended empirical questions. I see no good reason why we are not exploring 
them, and nothing to suggest they’d be inherently unjust.
When I give lectures or training sessions on implicit bias, some individuals 
remain resistant to the idea that they might be biased, but many others accept 
it, and often their first and most persistent question is what to do in response. 
They’re motivated to be less biased but lack concrete strategies. I tell them about 
some of the most promising institutional interventions and daily- life debiasing 
tricks, but it’s readily apparent to audiences that these interventions will not get 
us all the way there. One conspicuously missing piece of the puzzle, I submit, is 
the availability of humdrum ways to practice, which we recognize as necessary 
in a variety of other spheres of life, including learning musical instruments, lan-
guages, quantitative skills, and even ethical dispositions like courage and com-
passion. Kawakami’s training procedures strike me as a tangible, straightfor-
ward way to practice being less biased, yet they are widely discounted by social 
scientists, activists, policymakers, and philosophers. In this essay, I have tried to 
speak to critics’ most prominent concerns, regarding empirical efficacy, practical 
feasibility, and individualism. I appreciate that not everyone will be as bullish 
about the prospects of these specific procedures as I am, but to dismiss them 
wholesale is a mistake, which consigns to the shelf some tools that may have a 
distinctive role to play in the struggle for social justice.
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